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 Abstract 
This research provides a descriptive case study that chronicles the 
operational and engineering processes that were used to reduce total ownership 
cost for microwave power tube components of the AEGIS Shipbuilding Project while 
dramatically improving their mean time between failure. The processes used to 
achieve these results are important to understand in light of the current reductions in 
various acquisition support resources including financial support, manpower and in-
house technical expertise. In particular, this case highlights the role that Naval 
Warfare Centers can and do play in the acquisition process and its supporting 
engineering disciplines.   
Keywords: AEGIS, Total Ownership Cos, TOC, Mean time between failure, 
MTBF, Microwave Tubes, MWT, business processes, Cross Field Amplifier, CFA 
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 Introduction 
All ships of the AEGIS fleet, indeed the entire fleet, require Microwave Tubes 
(MWT) (Hoffer, 2003). Early in the development of the AEGIS program, one such 
MWT, the Cross Field Amplifier (CFA) proved to be a substantial cost driver. This 
study documents the identification of the root causes of this problem and the 
process that not only eliminated the problem but also yielded both an increase in 
tube mean time between failure (MTBF) and a much-lowered total ownership cost 
(TOC). This case chronicles the methods used to reduce TOC in a program that 
serves as an example of early spiral development. The objective of this study is to 
understand the process and recognize the business issues within it that are 
essential to maintaining system combat capability, enhancing system affordability 
and reducing TOC.  
Background 
The AEGIS shipbuilding program, arguably one of the largest and most 
successful acquisition programs in the Department of Defense (DoD), has provided 
the Navy with over 90 capable surface combatant ships. AEGIS ships now make up 
the majority of the Navy’s destroyer and all of its cruiser fleet. MWTs are used in 27 
CGs and 48 DDGs to date (Hoffer, 2003) and this number continues to grow. MWTs 
are the primary components in the radar systems of the AEGIS fleet. There are 
numerous other shipboard systems that utilize MWTs:SPS-48, SPS-49, MK-99, 
USC-38, and Phalanx to name just a few. Throughout the world, 57% of MWTs are 
used in radars; the manufacture of radar MWTs alone is a $280.3M market. Figure 1 
shows the world market for MWTs by application and type (Dutkowski, 2004-2005). 
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 Figure 1. The World Market for MWTs by Application and Type 
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It was the early 1980’s, the height of the Reagan defense build-up, and 
AEGIS was the centerpiece of the Navy’s shipbuilding program. Rear Admiral James 
B. Greene, Jr. was the project manager (PM) for the AEGIS shipbuilding project. 
Initial deployment of AEGIS cruisers was completed and departmental focus was 
shifting to include lifecycle cost control as well as enhanced system operational 
availability (Ao). At the same time, the DDG-51 class was in engineering design and 
development. The weapons systems of the ships were heavily dependent on MWTs 
with Cruisers using 176 per system and Destroyers 90. Figure 2 provides a picture 
of the MWTs used on these ships. Not surprisingly, MWTs became cost drivers for 
TOC and also for system, and thus ship, Ao. 
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 Figure 2. Tubes used in the AEGIS Weapons System 








In a regular monthly meeting with his staff, Admiral Greene was briefed on the 
status of MWTs. These meetings were held to review program execution, cost and 
schedule issues. Staff noted that the unit cost of MWTs had exceeded their 
expectations and that the mean time between failure (MTBF) of MWTs was very low. 
This situation had existed for some time with no improvement in sight without added 
management attention.  
The MWT 
The AEGIS weapons system had been in design and development for several 
years. Program decisions were based on, among other considerations, reliability 
estimates that included MWT reliability, cost estimates, and maintenance concepts. 
The use of MWTs in combat systems was extensive. The principals in the 
program—designers, planners, and decision-makers including contractors—knew 
the extent of the applications of MWTs in AEGIS ships. There was not just one type 
of MWT; several different MWTs were utilized in AEGIS ships, for instance, Cross 
Field Amplifiers (CFAs) in the radar systems and traveling wave tubes (TWTs) in 
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 electronic warfare systems. Though there were numerous applications of MWTs 
then, now they are used in even more war-fighting applications. Figure 3 (Dutkowski, 
2004-2005) shows a current example of MWT utilization in a CG-47 class ship. 
Figure 3. CG-47 Class MWT-based Systems 
















 SPY-1A  CFA
 SPY-1A  Ring-Bar TWT
 SPY-1A  Helix TWT
 SPG-62  CC-TWT
 SPS-49  Klystron
 UPX-29  Power Gridded Tube
 SPG-62 (Mk-99)  CC-TWT
 CIWS Mk 15  Klystron
 SLQ-32  Helix TWT
 
 APS-124  Magnetron
 ARQ-44  CC-TWT
  
 SPS-55  Magnetron
 HARPOON  Magnetron
 SPQ-9 (Mk-86)  CC-TWT
 SPQ-9 (Mk-86)  Klystron
  
 LN-66  Magnetron
All Combat Systems Above 1 GHz








As can be seen, many shipboard systems depend on MWTs. Figure 4 
(Dutkowski, 2004-2005) illustrates the usage of MWTs in various such systems. The 
prevalence of MWTs in Navy ships is shown in Figure 5. 
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 Figure 4. Usage of MWTs 
Source: Dutkowski, E.J., Jr. (2004-2005) 
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Figure 5. Current MWT Usage in the US Navy 
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 When RADM Greene was briefed by his staff, the manufacture of MWTs was 
an industry that was very process and material dependent with little process or 
configuration control. The tubes were, indeed, state-of-the-art technology for that era 
but they were, in the current vernacular, early “spirals” (Apte 2005).  Each 
succeeding version was an evolved version of the previous one.   This situation 
presented great challenges to the team to put controls in place in the manufacturing 
plants to reduce manufacturing risk. Through contract requirements (requiring 
configuration and process controls), investment of government dollars into product 
improvements and continual monitoring of product, these factors could be mitigated 
over time. 
Given the unit cost and MTBF data of the MWTs, the PM estimated tube 
replacement costs to be $1M/ship/year. Based on a then projected AEGIS fleet size 
of 40 ships, Admiral Greene calculated total annual cost for CFA tube replacement 
to be $40M—just to keep the AEGIS radar systems operational.  
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 The Problem 
The data presented to Admiral Greene highlighted that MWTs were costly to 
replace and costly to produce. With MTBF in the range of 1,300-12,000 hours and a 
high unit cost, they were a major contributor to TOC.  
The key players in the program understood the risks involved in the ”black art” 
of MWT production. This set the stage for tasking Warfare Center engineering 
specialists to take charge of this issue and craft engineering and logistics solutions. 
In any case, performance-versus-cost of MWTs was a problem and not using the 
tubes was not a technical solution. 
A parallel and nagging question of the day was that if MWTs are so difficult 
and expensive to produce (and at the same time essential to so many applications of 
AEGIS), then why not replace the tubes with solid-state components? This issue 
took considerable engineering expertise and time to answer with Figure 6 being 
developed to silence the critics. Simply put, the solid-state technology at that time 
was not mature enough to replace the vacuum devices.
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 Figure 6. Microwave Components Military Essential Electronics 












Admiral Greene was facing quite a few issues revolving around the MWT 
components. But an opportunity presented itself. There was soon to be a conference 
held at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on MWTs. The CEOs of all the 
companies that provided MWTs to the AEGIS shipbuilding project were attending 
the conference. The companies would both benefit from the success of AEGIS and 
would suffer if the performance/cost of MWTs remained the same. Admiral Greene 
sensed the potential for turnaround.  
Greene’s Solution 
Admiral Greene decided that instead of treating adversity as a constraint, he 
was going to exploit the same to solve the problem. He made a pitch specifically to 
the CEOs of the vendor companies. Focusing on CFAs, he explained to them that 
the problem he was facing was that CFAs had an operating cost of $1M/ship/year. 
- 8 - 
 He conveyed to them the criticality of CFAs to the AEGIS fleet. Figure 7 depicts the 
CFA and its prevalence in the AEGIS fleet. At the microwave power tube conference 
he challenged them, ”Propose something to fix this problem. Let us work together. 
As Project Manager, I promise you full cooperation. Let us collaborate and resolve 
this issue.” At Admiral Greene’s invitation, the CEOs came to his quarters in 
Hermann Hall at NPS.  A frank dialogue at this meeting laid the groundwork for 
implementing a successful process that ultimately led to a reduction in TOC and an 
increase in MTBF for CFAs. Although limited contractually on the extent he could be 
involved in internal company affairs, Admiral Greene did offer all the CEOs the 
opportunity to have him speak to each of their work forces to underscore the 
importance of their efforts in this critical national defense program.
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 Figure 7. AN/SPY- 1 CFA 













As he had agreed, Admiral Greene visited each of the tube production 
facilities with his staff. This staff included staff engineers, operations managers, and 
financial experts from the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Crane Indiana, the 
Navy’s In Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) for microwave power tubes. He 
challenged his staff to devise a solution. He felt confident they could do so because 
of the technical competence they demonstrated through the years in combat 
systems engineering and in particular microwave power tube technology.  
After initial evaluation, staff proposed a two-fold approach to the combined 
TOC/MTBF issues. The first was to assure an accurate diagnosis and repair of the 
tube (Hoffer, 2003); the second was an improved ability to locate and track all tubes 
that had been produced (Dutkowski, 2004-2005). Initial diagnostic trouble shooting 
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 revealed a metallurgical problem.  The anode of the CFA was made of high purity, 
electrical-grade copper which is quite soft. This copper also has a very low melting 
point. When a CFA turns on or during the change to a long waveform, the CFA has a 
tendency to arc between cathode and anode.  Excessive arcing leads to premature 
failure and is detrimental to the overall performance of the amplifier. Admiral 
Greene’s team discovered that the anode vanes were melting slightly and 
progressively due to arcing. The deterioration due to arcing was increasing—to the 
point that the tube would arc at shorter pulse lengths and at lower power levels. This 
erosion eventually led to tube failure. It was clear that better operating life could be 
obtained if the anode vanes could be prevented from melting due to arcing. The 
solution devised was to add a thin layer of molybdenum, which has a higher melting 
point than copper, at the ends of the anode vanes and to reduce the arcing by better 
processing of the tubes.  
The second issue to be resolved was an inventory control issue. The CFAs 
were high value assets and capturing them for repair vice disposal was crucial.  This 
required knowing where each tube was and then providing for their return to the 
designated repair facility. Additionally, tubes with the new modifications needed to 
be installed where and when appropriate so they could fit the empty sockets left by 
the un-improved tubes. Therefore, tracking the CFAs was vital. The team developed 
a method of serial number tracking of each tube. The principal behind it was the 
same as that behind the now common barcode and the recently introduced 
technology of radio frequency identification (RFID). The Crane team successfully 
implemented a serial number tracking program. The Crane team was successful for 
two reasons: they had in-house technical skills to successfully develop engineering 
solutions to the arcing problem and they had the managerial skills necessary to 
develop an effective inventory control and repair protocol. This process, in addition 
to configuration control of the manufacturing, added the ability to track changes 
introduced through the spiral development process to give visibility to the impact 
these changes had on performance. 
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 At the next biennial conference, Admiral Greene presented the results to 
industry as a ”good improvement.” Thanks to the improved tracking and repair 
processes of CFAs, the MTBF had increased substantially—to about 5000 hours 
(Greene, 2004)—and the operating cost was reduced by a third. However, he 
challenged his staff and industry to keep building on the three pillars for success of 
the initiative: accurate tracking of tubes, maintenance of the knowledge base 
necessary to stay abreast of technical developments in the tube industry and 
continuous improvement of the tube production process.  
After his departure from the program, these initiatives continued to thrive at 
Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center. It is still operating with increasingly impressive 
statistics: MTBF is up to 40,000-45,000 hours, and the cost per operating hour in 
2002 dollars has been reduced to $0.45/socket from $8.20/socket as shown in 
Figure 8 (Dutkowski, 2004-2005).  
The Accomplishment 
The success of initiatives such as inventory control using accurate tracking, 
maintaining technical knowledge base, and continuous improvement of the 
production process, has tremendous significance to the support of any combat 
system. The solution implemented regarding the CFA components in AEGIS is an 
excellent example of a successful pursuit of reduction of TOC (Boudreau & Naegle, 
2003). The effort initiated in the mid-1980s is still paying off. The arcing that led to 
the melting of anodes (which, as mentioned above, precipitated the failure of 
CFAs—resulting in a very low MTBF) prompted a series of well-managed steps to 
continue to improve the tubes. Tracking of the tubes was essential for locating and 
tracking the result of the changes. This was an extremely valuable initiative since it 
helped reduce the cycle-time for repair and change insertion by the real-time 
feedback to the manufacturer.  Knowing what caused the failure and where and 
when the failure occurred was critical to increasing operational availability. The 
ability to track the CFAs was critical to the success of the program. Likewise, an 
impressive string of engineering changes such as the modification in anode 
metallurgy, manufacturing processes improvements, controls, logistics, and 
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 configuration control have led to an increase in the MTBF of the tubes from 6000 
hours to 40,000-45,000 hours.  
These improvements have reduced the frequency of corrective maintenance 
and, therefore, the operating and support (O & S) costs. The changes in vane tips, 
tracking of MWTs (so that the location and circumstances of MWT malfunctions are 
known), and extra attention to business issues have dramatically improved the 
reliability and availability of the host weapons system. Of note, this same 
modification of the vane tips has been implemented in two other CFA configurations 
thus using the learning to advance the design of new systems. Other AEGIS MWTs 
have also undergone additional improvements and have yielded added O & S cost 
savings. Progress in reducing the cost/operating hour of AEGIS CFA tubes is shown 
in Figure 8 (Dutkowski, 2004-2005).
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 Figure 8. Cost/Operating Hour History 
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Even if just a small amount is saved on each tube, due to the large number of 
tubes used in the fleet, savings can be substantial for a small change in life-cycle 
cost. The V-chart in Figure 9 shows that investment in engineering and management 
initiatives throughout the lifecycle of a system can dramatically reduce TOC. This 
initiative has found application in 27 AEGIS cruisers (each of which includes 76 
CFAs) and 48 AEGIS destroyers (each equipped with 32 to 38 CFAs) to date. In 
2002 dollars, the annual savings averaged about $1.9 million per AEGIS cruiser and 
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 Figure 9. AWS Microwave Tube Engineering/Acquisition Program 
Source: Dutkowski, E.J., Jr. (2004-2005) 
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Several key factors contributed to the success of this initiative. The program 
achieved a high level of collaboration amongst all key parties including the Fleet, 
field activities and headquarters. In order for a project to succeed across functional 
departments such as design, planning, contracting and engineering, there needs to 
be a leader who will champion the new initiatives and processes. This leader, along 
with key team players, has to devise innovative programmatic and contractual 
provisions. Greene’s ability to integrate his team was a key element in that team’s 
success and he was able to leverage the existing AEGIS team to do so. The concept 
of an Integrated Product Team (IPT) is an initiative common today, but was not a by-
word 20 years ago. Likewise, although theoretically the use of an IPT is an effective 
business tactic, the difficulty in its implementation can be overcome only if a clear 
focus and vision is maintained by the team leader.  
In addition to the strength of Greene’s leadership, none of these successful 
steps could have been achieved without the in-house (government) technical 
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 competence and knowledge of Greene’s staff. In-house technical knowledge was 
essential to assuring industry collaboration. A knowledgeable (smart) buyer is 
essential in evaluating industry recommendations for technical and process 
changes. Consequently, retaining in-house expert technical personnel is critical to 
improving system operations and costs. These assets may be in the field or at 
headquarters or both, but they must exist on the government team. 
The above discussion of the small industrial base and process/material 
dependent manufacturing of the CFA suggests that there are very few, sometimes 
no, manufacturers for customized defense products. Due to this lack of competition, 
integrity has to be maintained in writing the best value contracts. It has been proven 
in the private sector over and over again that competition breeds both diversity in 
products and helps the best among them to survive. The absence of competition in 
the manufacturing of some defense products adds responsibility to the program 
manager; he/she must ensure the quality of the product and contract. Therefore, 
evaluating best value contracts is key in this type of acquisition. Many times the 
government must buy critical product in a small production lot environment, 
precluding the ability to have a competitive contract situation. The small production 
lot environment requires competent government oversight to be effective.  Again, 
one must have technically competent staff within the government to do so. 
In addition, the production pipeline of such customized defense products has 
to be smooth to achieve significant cost savings. A disruptive supply will likely stifle 
MTBF improvements. The stop-and-start of production adds the disadvantage of a 
high fixed cost. Therefore continuous production is desirable. This requires a 
procuring agency that views long-term requirements and vendor loading versus the 
short-term (meet the current demand) perspective. This continuity is especially 
necessary when manufacturers are training workers for such tailored products. In 
the case of the CFA, the very stable AEGIS shipbuilding project provided just such a 
stable demand for CFAs  
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 Business Issues 
On the surface, this discussion is a simple success story of identifying CFA 
failures due to arcing and engineering their prevention by tracking and modifying the 
tubes, thereby increasing MTBF, and at the same time lowering production costs. 
What is impressive and powerful about this accomplishment is the process through 
which the problem was diagnosed and the cure implemented. “In my wildest dreams, 
I did not think we could come this far,” said Greene about the success of this 
program (Greene, 2004). What is crucial to this discussion is the recognition that this 
process has long-reaching roots in Acquisition strategy—then and now. This 
detection, analysis, and solution process encompasses profound technical, 
managerial, and policy issues. Some of the business issues this story highlights—
such as organizational integration, evolutionary acquisition, theory of constraints, the 
six sigma/ continuous improvement theories of total quality management, 
outsourcing, operations management, and contract/cost/budgets, are instructive for 
any program manager. 
The dramatic improvement implemented by Greene and his team was and is 
a result of organizational integration of key players, an IPT in today’s vernacular. 
This collaboration included the AEGIS Program Office, Communications and Power 
Industries (CPI, a vendor that was formerly part of Varian and provided the CFA), 
Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center, the Navy Man Tech Office, and Raytheon (the 
prime contractor). The collaborative effort for reduction in TOC and increase in 
MTBF of the CFA had two major facets: acquisition and engineering. Individuals 
from these disciplines formed the integrated product team.  
The evolving production of the CFA reminds the researcher of the current 
strategy of Evolutionary Acquisition and its process of Spiral Development (Apte, 
2005). There are similarities between the process through which the CFAs evolved 
and the current trends of incremental design and production based on the input of 
warfighters. Spiral Development is a set of acquisition activities that are incorporated 
in an evolving baseline using increments. Each increment increases the capability of 
the product. Each increment is completed at a rapid pace. Each increment builds 
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 over each previous spiral. Since all the CFAs were customized products, each 
version that was produced was a modification of the previous version. The versions 
were redesigned based on user input so that the lessons learned from the previous 
version helped reduce the flaws in the production of the next version. Each 
increment included a reassessment of risks and assumptions. These are also the 
basis of Spiral Development. These days each increment creates a functioning 
prototype at the end of which lessons learned are evaluated; before starting the next 
increment, a decision is made about whether to proceed or not. In essence, the CFA 
evolution is an early example of what is now termed spiral development.  
Numerous program challenges existed in the form of resources, constraints, 
new and evolving technologies, lack of understanding of failure root causes, and 
communications between program participants across the country to name a few. 
But, the theory of constraints suggests that such constraints can be exploited to the 
advantage of the system. In the presence of constraints, one need first identify the 
system constraints.  Next, one should decide how to exploit them. Thirdly, one 
should subordinate everything else to this decision. Lastly, one should remove the 
system constraints to solve the problem.  That is precisely what was done here. For 
example, Greene exploited the high unit production cost and low MTBF by 
challenging the manufacturers to discover a process which would deliver a quality 
tube to the program, increase MTBF and reduce TOC.   
One of the important tools in Total Quality Management is the Cause-and-
Effect diagram, sometimes known as the fish-bone or Ishikawa diagram. This 
diagram is used to sort out the causes of the problem. Brainstorming sessions of 
groups of personnel involved are required. These sessions help identify complete 
lists of causes of the problem and the relationship between causes and effects in a 
rational manner. This process educates everyone involved in the system regarding 
the causes and effects of the problem. This engineering process revealed the 
melting of the CFAs during arcing. By asking questions such as: Why did the tube 
fail? Why did the vanes melt? What was the cause of low melting point? Why cannot 
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 the solid state be used? Greene’s team was able to expose and correct the root 
cause of the low MTBF statistics for the CFAs. 
The literature and current research in outsourcing indicates that outsourcing 
products, not service, is more advantageous to most systems, especially where the 
service involves the defense of a nation. Outsourcing the support of a weapon 
system eliminates the need for in-house technical knowledge. Absence of such 
personnel prohibits creative approaches to system failures. It also inhibits challenges 
to the industry that supports the same system. Decreasing or eliminating the 
retention of in-house experts in certain services may prove to be penny wise and 
pound foolish.  
As noted earlier, the evolution of the AEGIS CFAs presents an early example 
of what is now termed spiral development. As such, since spiral development is the 
preferred acquisition strategy in DoD today, this CFA case has even more 
relevance. If new weapons systems in DoD are going to be largely spiral in nature, 
then there will be many future opportunities to replicate the CFA evolution. If TOC of 
weapons systems are to be constrained, then program officers must be prepared to 
emulate the CFA strategy described herein. This will require the maintenance of a 
technically competent work force both at program inception and during system 
deployment. This later role has been historically filled in the Navy by competent 
ISEAs resident in Naval Warfare Centers, which each specialize in particular 
technologies. The author suggests, using this CFA case as an example, that it is 
imperative that this skill set be maintained if DoD hopes to contain TOC in a spiral 
development world. Colvard and Doyle (2006) reach a similar conclusion albeit on a 
broader organizational scale. 
The CFA case also raises the notion that it is crucial for a DoD entity to play a 
“stewardship” role when necessary to preserve DoD’s ability to obtain an affordable 
product/process which is critical to national defense needs.  Such a role is 
envisioned when products or processes have limited commercial interest and 
support, on-shore sources are non-existent or insufficient, and/or unique military 
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 logistics requirements exist. In a stewardship role, a facility such as Crane Naval 
Surface Warfare Center would facilitate communication and knowledge sharing 
among industry, academia and military users of products and processes. The center 
would also maintain crucial capabilities and knowledge required for test and 
evaluation, Logistics, and for certain manufacturing and repair. This stewardship 
would also identify and assure support of technologies underlying the product or 
process. Last, but definitely not the least, there needs to be an entity that will serve 
as an advocate for programs targeted at maintaining the viability of the product or 
process and work to maintain a balanced budget strategy to support the critical 
industrial base. This notion makes yet another argument, proven in the CFA case, 
for retaining an in-house technically competent workforce and a Industrial 
Stewardship program.   
One of the most important aspects of operations management is process 
management. Process management is an ongoing methodology for evaluating, 
analyzing, and improving the performance quality of a key business process. A 
process is evaluated by establishing process ownership, determining user 
requirements, and evaluating and rating the process. This process is then analyzed 
by benchmarking, developing and reviewing solutions with participants, and 
developing improvement plans. Process improvement is then achieved by 
implementing the process improvement plan, measuring the results, obtaining user 
feedback and, at the end, doing it all over again. Clearly, without such a continuous 
process improvement strategy, the CFA program would not have achieved such 
impressive results. Key to the success of this process is configuration control and 
the tracking of the product.
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 Conclusion 
The goal of this research was to provide a descriptive case study that 
chronicled the operational and engineering processes used to reduce one aspect of 
the total ownership cost for the Aegis Shipbuilding Project. In the early days (circa 
1983) of the Aegis Shipbuilding Project, the program office recognized that the 
numerous microwave tubes used in the Aegis radar system would significantly 
contribute to operational costs.  As a result, an initiative was put in place to focus on 
substantially reducing these costs.  The initiative was eventually applied across the 
whole spectrum of Navy microwave power tubes.  This Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC) effort has been extremely successful as various initiatives 
have driven down cost metrics (such as dollars/operating hour) while achieving a 
significant increase in MTBF.  The engineering and management processes used to 
achieve these results are important to understand in light of recent manpower 
reductions in the services as well as an erosion of the in-house engineering skill 
base.  In particular, this case highlights the role that Naval Surface Warfare Centers 
can and do play in the acquisition process.  This case study validates these 
successes and identifies the underlying factors that catalyzed them.   
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